Abstract. Privacy analysis is critical but also a time-consuming and tedious task. We present a formalization which facilitates designing and auditing privacy properties of IT systems. It is based on static taint analysis and makes ow and processing of privacy-critical data explicit, globally as well as on the level of individual data subjects. Formally, we show equivalence to traditional label-based information ow security and overall soundness with Isabelle/HOL. Our model is practically applicable as it directly addresses relevant data protection goals of privacy and can be incorporated into common procedures of security engineering. We demonstrate applicability in two real-world case studies, thereby uncovering previously unknown errors.
generally facilitates the generation of architecture specications for IT systems and provides guidance for auditing their concrete implementation by directing focus on aspects important for privacy.
We show applicability of our model in two real-world case studies. In the rst case study, an energy monitoring system, we could make the informal claims of the system's original architects explicit and verify them.
In the second case study, a smartphone measurement system, we additionally demonstrate the complete audit of the real-world implementation in a fullyautomated manner, uncovering previously unknown bugs. To the best of our knowledge, this is the rst time that such an audit, which bridges the gap from an abstract taint analysis to complex low-level rewall rules, has been performed completely with the assurance level provided by the theorem prover Isabelle/HOL [21] .
Another contribution is integrating a fully formalized privacy model based on taint analysis into a larger, formal policy framework.
While our model is mathematically concise, transforming it into an executable and convenient verication framework is a non-trivial and error-prone task. To provide high condence in our framework, we have proven all properties of the model and the overall correctness of our framework in Isabelle/HOL (cf.
Section Availability).
In detail, our novel contributions to the body of knowledge in this area are: 
Operationalization of Privacy
The requirement of security has been made more tangible and veriable by deriving protection goals, in particular condentiality, integrity and availability (CIA) [22] . Ptzmann and Rost [23] applied the same methodology to privacy and derived the protection goals unlinkability (of collected data) and transparency (of the data collection and manipulation processes). Unlinkability describes the impossibility to combine present information so that no further information gain can be achieved. Unlinkability itself has already been formalized before by Steinbrecher [25] as a generalization of anonymity. Transparency requires that users can gain insight into processes and systems which work with privacy-critical data. It realizes the base upon which surveillance and control of data processing can be carried out. Later, Bock and Rost [4] added intervenability (of a data subject in the data processing), eectively creating another triad of protection goals. Intervenability addresses the ability on the one hand of data subjects to carry out control over their data and to exercise their user rights and on the other hand of process owners to demonstrably be in control their technical systems
The proposal of Bock, Rost and Ptzmann has been adapted in the Privacy and Data Protection by Design report [9] and extended by the German Standardized Data Protection Model [2] 1 . The German model adds data minimization as another protection goal when striving for privacy-preservation. They argue that privacy-threats, being misuse and abuse of data, is most eectively mitigated when the amount of processed data is reduced itself. Hence, data minimization aims for reducing the amount of privacy-critical information from the beginning and in each step where this is possible. They consider this protection goal to be fundamental, as it does not protect present vulnerable assets, but reduces the actual amount of assets being at risk.
In consequence, when reducing the amount of critical data or the criticality itself, the required strength of data protection measures can also be reduced. This is based on their assumption that the best data protection is not processing privacy-critical data at all.
Another conceptualization of privacy is the Global Privacy Standard (GPS) [5] .
Comparing leading privacy practices and codes from around the world, the 27th
International Data Protection Commissioners Conference aimed for develop [ing] a harmonized set of fair information practices. It identied ten principles to be respected when handling personal data of individuals. The principles regard the complete lifecycle of data from collection to processing to nal deletion. While being more organizationally than technically oriented, compatibility to the aforementioned approach can be identied. The protection goals of transparency is partially encoded in the principle of Openness, which allows individuals to have access to [i] nformation about the policies and practices relating to the management of personal information. Data minimization is directly represented but also includes the minimization of data linkability, eectively stating a weaker variant of unlinkability. Lastly, the principle of Compliance corresponds to intervenability.
In 2010, Cavoukian [6] developed the information management principles, Privacy by Design (PbD) . PbD identies principles which help considering privacyprotection from the beginning of the design of a system in order to make it a default property of newly developed systems. For existing systems, the principles give guidance for manual privacy audits. Structurally, PbD is located on a higher level of abstraction than GPS. Some PbD principles subsume multiple GPS statements; further principles are introduced by PbD, which were not yet covered by GPS.
1 This concept is also designed to be compatible with the data protection laws of Germany.
Jaap-Henk Hoepman [17] identies a gap between the high-level principles stated by PbD and their application by incorporating privacy-protection into the design of a concrete technical system. He states that further measures, privacy design strategies, must be provided to software engineers and developers in order to actually implement privacy. From a body of current privacy laws and policies, similar to [5] , he derived his proposed strategies. Due to the stated motivation, his work hence is more concrete than either GPS or PbD. The rst half of the presented strategies is data-centric and describe specic measures in order to reduce the criticality of data present in a system. The second half is processoriented and focuses the relation of the system to their users.
The initially stated protection goals can be rediscovered in this work: The strategy Minimize corresponds to data minimization, Separate aims for unlinkability, Inform partially covers transparency, and Control together with Demonstrate reect intervenability.
In line with related work, we also base our understanding of privacy upon the data protection goals of unlinkability, transparency, intervenability, and data minimization.
Evaluation Assurances
Even for clearly specied privacy requirements, the condence in a system evaluation may vary vastly. For example, the Common Criteria [8] dene several Evaluation Assurance Levels (EAL). For the highest assurance level, formal verication is required, e. g. using the theorem prover Isabelle/HOL [21] . One remarkable work in the eld of formal verication with Isabelle/HOL is the verication of information ow enforcement for the C implementation of the seL4 microkernel [20] . Similarly, to provide high condence in our results, we have carried out this research completely in Isabelle/HOL. The proofs are provided in our theory les (cf. Section Availability).
Taint Analysis
Taint Analysis in general We introduce the concepts of taint analysis by a simple, ctional example: A house, equipped with a smart meter to measure its energy consumption. The owner also provides location information via her smartphone to allow the system to turn o the lights when she leaves the home.
Once every month, the aggregated energy consumption is sent over the internet to the energy provider for billing.
We are interested in the privacy implications of this setup and perform a taint tracking analysis. The system architecture is visualized in Fig. 1 Taint Analysis in Android In the Android world, taint analysis has been successfully used recently. TaintDroid [15] uses software instrumentation to track taint information at runtime from pre-dened taint sources, such as the address book or sensors. It then assesses whether tainted data leaves the phone via a network interface, for example. Tracking itself happens on the variable, method, and message level by storing taint labels in memory. Taint labels are also preserved when data is saved to les or databases. TaintDroid's trust model relies on the rmware being the gateway for accessing data considered privacy-critical.
Their main contribution is the integration of a multitude of known techniques into a single approach and to demonstrate their applicability to the Android platform. McClurget al. [19] also present a runtime, dynamic taint instrumentation framework for Android. The main dierence to TaintDroid is, that their framework does not require root rights. A user needs to manually specify a policy with taint sources and leak destinations.
DroidDisintegrator [26] is built on top of TaintDroid. It rst computes a static information ow policy which is presented to the user at the time of app installation. An app is repackaged such that enforcement of this policy at runtime is very lightweight. To compute the policy, DroidDisintegrator relies on dynamic taint analysis and input fuzzing to trigger the valid execution paths of an app. Schuster and Tromer [26] make several important observations: Because of the complexity of information ow security, it is hardly used in mainstream apps. Therefore, Schuster and Tromer simplify the use of information ow security by decreasing the granularity at which DroidDisintegrator operates. They demonstrate that Android components provide an appropriate granularity for information ow tracking which places less burden on the developer than other IFC frameworks [26, 1.3] . Our model also supports a low-granularity approach by enabling the usage of arbitrary granularity: parts of a system can be modeled with high granularity providing more precision or lower granularity yielding easier applicability. Additionally, we introduce the concept of system boundaries, which allows encapsulation of several ne-grained components into one larger coarse-grained component without the loss of information.
Tracking implicit information ow with a practically acceptable false positive/negative rate is still an unsolved problem. DroidDisintegrator avoids this problem in a very domain specic way: Implicit information ow is completely disregarded when the policy is generated. Assuming good programming practice and best-practice use of the Android API, valid and intentional information ow should be explicit. Remaining (probably malicious) implicit information ow, since it is not contained in the policy, is consequently prohibited at runtime.
Our generic analysis framework is built on the same principle.
Further Successful Formal Security Approaches for Android In a broader context, Bagheri et al. [3] analyzed the Android permission system. They used bounded verication with the Alloy tool to nd design aws. Permissions, which focus on access control, may be considered complementary to taint analysis, which focuses on information ow.
Fragkaki et al. [16] build a model of the Android permission system in order to specify desired security properties and to verify whether these requirements hold for the given system. They show, that these requirements are only partly fullled by the examined versions of Android. In line with our work, they consider taint analysis for information ow security. They utilize a noninterference model to formalize it in a dynamic context.
Models, Formalization, and topoS
As illustrated in Figure 1 , a graph can be conveniently used to describe a system architecture. Since a graph (without taint label annotations) species the permitted information ows and all allowed accesses, we will call such a graph a policy. We will always assume that a graph G = (V, E) is syntactically wellformed, i. e. all vertices occuring in the edges E are also listed in the nodes V .
To analyze, formalize, and verify policies represented as graphs, we utilize the topoS [12, 14] framework. topoS allows specication of predicates over the policy. These predicates are called security invariants. The security invariants follow special design criteria to ensure the overall soundness of topoS. To dene a new security invariant, topoS imposes strict proof obligations. In return, topoS oers arbitrary composability of all security invariants and generic analysis/verication algorithms.
Formalization & Implementation
We formalize tainting as a security invariant for topoS. To foster intuition, we rst present a simplied model, which does not support trust or untainting. However, we have aligned the paper constructively such that all the results obtained for simple model follow analogously for the full model. All details can be found in our accompanying Isabelle/HOL formalization (cf. Section Availability).
We assume we have a total function t which returns the taint labels for an entity. For example, t SmartHomeBox = {energy, location}.
Intuitively, information ow security according to the taint model can be understood as follows. Information leaving a node v is tainted with v's taint labels, hence every receiver r must have the respective taint labels to receive the information. In other words, for every node v in the policy, all nodes r which are reachable from v must have at least v's taint labels. Representing reachability by the transitive closure (i. e. E + ), the invariant can be formalized as follows:
For this formalization, we discharged the proof obligations imposed by topoS.
First, the security invariant is monotonic, which means that prohibiting more ows will never make the policy less secure. Second, in case of a violation, there is always a set of ows which are responsible for the violation and the violation can be repaired by prohibiting said ows. We consider tainting as an information ow security (IFS) invariant. For topoS, this means a violation occurs as soon as a labeled information reaches an unintended receiver. Our formalization also discharges the additional proof obligations imposed by topoS for IFS invariants. A user will unlikely provide a total assignment t of taint labels. topoS can take a partial assignment and, with the help of a secure default parameter, autocomplete it to a total function. For this, topoS imposes the proof obligation for IFS invariants that the default parameter can never hide a violating information ow. In addition, it requires that the default parameter is uniquely dened, i. e.
it is the only value which can always uncover violations. Intuitively, if we assume that a user has given labels to the important taint sources, the default parameter needs to be the empty set of taint labels since this will uncover all undesirable ows from labeled to unlabeled sources. Therefore, our invariant fullls all proof obligations of topoS. 2 
Analysis: Tainting vs. Bell-LaPadula Model
The Bell-LaPadula model (BLP) is the traditional, de-facto standard model for label-based information ow security. The question arises whether we can justify our taint model using BLP.
topoS comes with a pre-dened formalization of the BLP model [14] . The labels in BLP, often called security clearances, are dened as a total order:
which assigns a security clearance to each node. Since our policy model does not distinguish read from write actions, the BLP invariant simply states that 2 We only have sketched the rough idea here, the full proofs can be found in our formalization: interpretation Taints: SecurityInvariant-IFS receivers must have the necessary security clearance for the information they receive:
Inspired by BLP, we show an alternative denition for our tainting invariant:
Lemma 1 (Localized Denition of Tainting).
Proof. We assume a syntactically well-formed graph. First, we note that the tainting invariant can be rewritten such that instead of quantifying over all vertices, it quanties over the rst node of all edges. Subsequently, by induction over the transitive closure, the invariant can be rewritten to the desired form.
Lemma 1 also provides a computational ecient formula, which only iterates over all edges and never needs to compute a transitive closure.
We will now show that one tainting invariant is equal to BLP invariants for every taint label. We dene a function project a Ts, which translates a set of taint labels Ts to a security clearance depending on whether a is in the set of taint labels. Formally, project a Ts ≡ if a ∈ Ts then confidential else unclassified. Using function composition, the term project a • t is a function which rst looks up the taint labels of a node and projects them afterwards.
Theorem 1 (Tainting and Bell-LaPadula Equivalence simple).
Proof. See Analysis_Tainting.thy
The`→'-direction of our theorem shows that one tainting invariant guarantees individual privacy according to BLP for each taint label. This implies that every user of a system can obtain her personal privacy guarantees. The`←'-direction shows that tainting is as expressive as BLP. This justies the theoretic foundations w.r.t. the well-studied BLP model. These ndings are in line with Denning's lattice interpretation [10] ; however, to the best of our knowledge, we are the rst to discover and formally prove this connection in the presented context.
The theorem can be generalized for arbitrary (but nite) sets of taint labels A. The project function then maps to a numeric value of a security clearance by taking the cardinality of the intersection of A with Ts. For example, if we want to project {location, temp}, then {name} is unclassified, {name, location, zodiac} is confidential, and {name, location, zodiac, temp} is secret.
Untainting and Adding Trust
Real-world application requires the need to untaint information, for example, when data is encrypted or properly anonymized. The taint labels now consist of two components: the labels a node taints and the labels it untaints. Let t be a total function t which returns the taints and untaints for an entity. We extend the simple tainting invariant to support untainting:
To abbreviate a node's labels, we will write XY , where X corresponds to the taints and Y corresponds to the untaints. For example, in Fig. 1 we have t Anonymizer = ∅{location}.
We impose the type constraint that Y ⊆ X, i. e. untaints ⊆ taints. We implemented the datatype such that XY is extended to X ∪ Y Y . Regarding t Anonymizer now corresponds to {location}{location}, for which the tainting invariant holds and which also corresponds to our intuitive understanding of untainting. However, this is a fundamental requirement for the overall soundness of the invariant. Without the constraint, there can be dead untaints, i. e. untaints which can never have any eect, which would violate the uniqueness property required by topoS for default parameters and cause further problems in pathological corner cases. Yet, with this type constraint, as indicated earlier, all insights obtained for the simple model now follow analogously for this model.
Analysis: Tainting' vs. Bell-LaPadula Model'. In topoS' library, there is a predened formalization of the BLP model with trusted entities [14] . In the context of BLP, a trusted entity is allowed to declassify information, i. e. receive information of any security clearance and redistribute with its own clearance (which may be lower than the clearance of the received information). This concept is comparable to untainting. Let trusted extract the trusted ag from an entity's attributes and c extract the security clearance.
Our insights about the equality follow analogously. Let project a (XY ) be a function which translates taints (X ) and untaints (Y ) labels to security clearances c and the trusted ag. Let c = if a ∈ (X \ Y ) then confidential else unclassified and trusted = a ∈ Y . Theorem 2 (Tainting and Bell-LaPadula Equivalence full).
Similarly to the version without trust, the theorem can be generalized for arbitrary (but nite) sets of taint labels.
System
Boundaries topoS provides a number of useful analyses. For example, given a taint label specication, topoS can compute all permitted ows which is invaluable for validating a given specication. However, topoS might lack knowledge about architectural constraints which leads to the computation of an unrealistic amount of ows.
For example, in Fig. 3 , CollectDroid is one physical machine and Dec-A is one isolated software component running on it. Dec-A is neither physically reachable from outside of the machine nor has direct network connectivity itself. We want to provide this knowledge to topoS. Therefore, we model systems with clearly dened boundaries. This is visualized in Fig. 3 by the dotted rectangles; entities which are partially outside the rectangle represent system boundaries. We dene internal components such as Dec-A as nodes which are only accessible from inside the system. We dene passive system boundaries to be boundaries which only accept incoming connections. Analogously, active system boundaries are boundaries which only establish outgoing connections. A boundary may be both.
A topoS invariant must either be an access control or information ow invariant. An access control invariant restricts accesses from the outside, an information ow invariant restricts leakage to the outside. However, internal components of a system, e. g. Dec-A, require both: they should neither be accessible from components outside of the system nor leak data to outside components. We overcame this limitation of topoS by constructing a model for system boundaries which is internally translated to two invariants: an access control invariant and an information ow invariant. We have integrated the concept of system boundaries into topoS and proven the desired behavior of our implementation.
Applicability
Our understanding of privacy focuses on the data protection goals of unlinkability, transparency, intervenability, and data minimization. We show that our approach supports the assessment of system privacy as a whole by making privacycritical data streams explicit and providing insights into the fulllment of these very protection goals.
Data Privacy Protection Goals
Between our model and privacy data protection goals, a mapping can be realized which allows deriving statements about system privacy from the ndings based on the model. Unlinkability. Each combination of two or more labels in any component's taint set shows which information can be potentially linked.
If the possible linking is not desired nor necessary, two remedies are as follows: Splitting the path of the data ows not to be linkable. By separating them, there is no component where linking could actually happen. Otherwise, one can intervene on the data level and transform it so that linking of information becomes infeasible. This addresses anonymization and pseudonymization, aiming for removal of identiers which previously allow the combination of the data in question.
Transparency and Intervenability. Given an overall system specication, a user might be interested in her individual privacy implications. Starting with a system model using our formalism, this can be done by applying the project function of Section 3.1. Let a be a user's taint label (or let A be the set of a user's taint labels for the generalized theorem), then applying project a to all taint labels in the graph produces an individual information ow policy for the user. All entities having a high security clearance or being trusted in the new policy can be considered critical for the user's privacy. As a consequence, this can improve the user's understanding about the processing of her data and her ability to intervene in its ow by posting applications of information or vetoing against data usage, for example.
For internal application, the projection can also be used for identication of components which unintentionally process a certain type of privacy-critical information improving the transparency of the system regarding their providers.
Data Minimization. The taint labels of an entity are a natural measure for the amount of dierent data an entity can access. A very simple example of such a metric is the cardinality of the taint set. It follows the assumption that the initial criticality of each taint label is equal, and more information of dierent taints being processed implies more criticality of the component. This can be valid for systems which handle a certain kind of information (e.g. credit card information) for several users, and for each user, an individual taint label has been declared.
Then the cardinality of the taint set reects the amount of distinct information an adversary could obtain from the given component. This is realistic, as data breaches with many aected users are usually considered more severe than data breaches with few aected users. However, the later given case studies show that data criticality is not always trivially derivable from the mere number of taints. For future work, we want to consider more complex metrics that consider semantically overlapping taint labels and support labels of dierent criticality.
Security and Risk Assessment
Following the general methodology of security and risk assessment, our approach supports the steps of asset identication; the creation of a trust model and an adversary model. Asset Identication. Among others, the criticality of the components corresponds to its taint sets. Critical components are components possessing one or more taint labels thus providing an initial indication as to where more detailed examination should be performed when the overall system's privacy-criticality is assessed. Projection of taint labels, as previously described, supports analysis of more specic privacy-criticality. Additionally, degrees of criticality can be dierentiated by introducing a criticality metric as referred to under protection goal Data Minimization.
Trust Model. The formalism dierentiates trust assumptions regarding the system into two categories: trust in edges and trust in nodes of a given policy graph.
Trust in edges corresponds to data ow control. The model helps to understand how systems exchange critical data and which trust assumptions are implied by these transmissions. topoS supports this understanding by automatically examining whether a given system fullls the specied security invariants.
Trust in nodes corresponds to trust in the integrity of components. Here, the model makes explicit which critical data is handled by each system component.
A highly relevant special case of trust in nodes is given when untainting labels are present. Untainting, by denition, corresponds to the reduction of private information. This implies trust that this reduction is carried out correctly on the semantic level. This is also made explicit via our model. topoS can verify the legitimacy of data ows given this trust assumption. By formalization, untainting components of a system and their expected untainting functionality become easily identiable. The verication of semantic correctness is still to be carried out manually.
Adversary Model. The specication of passive and active system boundaries entails groups of attack vectors and generic protection measures. The clear separation between these two types of boundaries can be found, e. g. in strict separation kernels [20] . In networked environments, there are seldom purely passive boundaries because a system which receives requests often also provides a response and usually, a stateful, bidirectional connection is established. Strictly spoken, in this setting, many boundaries are both passive and active. In the following we will only consider the application layer of network communication. Hence, even when TCP is bidirectional, the protocol on the higher layers can be unidirectional. Especially, when using HTTP/S, we omit contentless status code responses in our considerations.
As a measure of fundamental access restrictions on the network level, automatic rewall conguration (Section 4.3) becomes applicable. Furthermore, intrusion detection systems can be applied.
Implementation support
The aspect of system boundaries in the model species which components are thought to be either able to connect to or to be contacted by other systems. The taint information denes which systems may actually obtain certain data.
In distributed systems, the combination of system boundary specication and taint information can be used to enforce information ow control and component separation on the network level by the utilization of rewalls.
topoS is able to automatically derive rewall rules, which cover the whole set of possible connections and suppress those not necessary for the dened data ows or violating the dened privacy goals.
It becomes especially useful when it is used to complement code auditing of critical components as another layer of protection or to substitute them if e.g.
third-party components cannot be thoroughly examined.
Derivation of Programming Guidelines. The benets with respect to auditing have been explained in the sections above. Besides this a posteriori support, preventive measures can also be derived. Given a system, which is already in productive use but nevertheless further developed. Then it is useful being able to derive programming guidelines from the formal model. They should give programmers an overview over allowed and prohibited data ows which helps them to correctly implement the security and privacy concept.
Evaluation
For the purpose of a case study, we use two distributed systems for data collection which are deployed at the Technical University of Munich. First, we describe the systems, their purpose and their handling of privacy-critical data as well as their architecture. Then we present the modeling of the systems in topoS. In the second case study the steps of system and taint label specication are performed analogous to the rst study and hence not further elaborated on. In a last step, we present the results of the insights gained by the application of our formalism.
IDEM
The project IDEM [18] focuses on energy monitoring systems (EMS). The purpose of an EMS is to support the reduction of energy consumption in the monitored area by providing detailed and ne-grained insights in the actual use of energy per room. These information help to identify the most greedy, faulty or incorrectly congured devices in the area and enable responsible sta to take appropriate actions like repairing or replacing identied devices. Furthermore, an EMS can also be used to carry out consumption billing with higher granularity.
The hardware of an o-the-shelf EMS consists of two components. A logging unit which is attached to the fuse box of the area to monitor, transforms the analogue signal into digital data points. A directly connected controller obtains these data points and POSTs them via HTTPS to a cloud service. Data are stored there and made available via a web-based GUI providing measures for statistical analysis and visualization.
Privacy Criticality We consider the measured information to be privacycritical [18] , as the energy consumption of devices is highly correlated with the presence and behaviour of building inhabitants using these devices. We exemplify this point with the following scenario: Given, the measured rooms are oce rooms for at maximum two person each. Then, each room contains approximately the same equipment like computer, display, telephone, etc. The typical use of these devices results in a certain consumption pattern on every working day. E.g. due to automatic standby functions of displays as well as computers and similar eects, power consumption lowers when people leave their working place. This allows to carry out surveillance of user behaviour by misusing the EMS. Especially tracking of work begin and end times as well as the number and duration of breaks becomes easily possible. We modied the system in order to achieve the following improvements: Collected information does not have to leave the building but is stored on a local server. Access control is not carried out by user authentication against a trusted system which has full access but by cryptographic means instead. Data is preprocessed for dierent audiences, so that each audience only gets the minimum of data which is needed to carry out their task. From the provider's point of view, these measures are motivated by data protection laws and policies as well as the mitigation of data breach consequences. System Specication The EMS can be modelled by two components: The logger, being the data source, creates digital data points and the controller pushes those data points to a given target. The controller is recongured not to send data to the cloud but to the local privacy-preserving preprocessing and storage system (P4S) via a secured channel. Hence, the logger is an internal component while the controller is an active system boundary. The analogue/digital transformation is not considered a relevant border in our context. The P4S consists of the Input-API, a directed acyclic graph of preprocessing modules, and a storage system. The Input-API obtains the data, when POSTed to the P4S, and hence a passive system boundary. The Input-API acts as the entry node of the graph structure. The exit node forwards the preprocessed data to the storage component, consequently being an active system boundary. All other nodes are regarded to be internal, but are also considered in the modelling.
The actual shape of the graph and the selection of nodes depend on the concrete system goals and the user roles which shall later obtain the collected information. The purpose of the other nodes is as follows: Given a predicate, ltering nodes only pass through data points which match the predicate, all other data is dropped. The aim is to split a single data stream containing data points from all rooms and users into multiple streams which only contain data about a single entity. It is obvious that the former combined stream is more privacy-critical as correlations between dierent entities can be analysed. Separation itself is already a measure of privacy improvement [17] .
Aggregation nodes transform multiple data points into a single data point using aggregate functions like the sum, average or median. Aggregation is also a measure of privacy improvement as it removes information details and prevents propagation of data which has higher information value and accuracy than needed for a given purpose [17] . An example where this measure can be taken, is when billing information are derived from the consumption data which initially had a precision of seconds to minutes. Then, all data points are summed up to the overall amount consumed per month.
Encryption nodes implement access control on the data level. For each encryption node in the graph, target recipients are also specied. As a consequence, the outgoing data can only be read by authorized recipients. Besides privacyuncritical publicly published information, all information owing on a path from the source of the graph to the data storage component has to pass an encryption nodes before being forwarded to the latter. Each path is eectively the preprocessing steps for a specic group of recipients.
After owing through the exit node, the data is transmitted to and saved in the storage component of the P4S. As data is encrypted, access is enabled by indexes build upon stream meta data. This includes e. g. the data type and timestamps or time intervals. Decryption happens on the data consumers' local system after querying and retrieval.
Taint Label Specication We specify the taint labels as described in Fig. 2. For the current scenario, we assume four users, each possessing their own taint label A, B, C, and D.
The logger is a central unit, hence it taints all labels {A, B, C, D}. The data points are internally forwarded to the controller, requiring the same taint labels for it. The same applies for forwarding them to the Input-API, although traversing system boundaries.
Filtering nodes remove all but one specied taint label. This is expressed in the combination of tainting and untainting labels. Each ltering node F K with K ∈ M obtains data of all taints and then removes the data of the taints M \ K, eectively untainting the labels M \ K. Optionally, as shown for user C, an aggregation node may untaint given data and derive a new low taint label from it. This reects two aspects of its behaviour: First, it receives privacy-critical data of only a single taint. Second, the output data of taint K low is considered to be semantically less privacy-critical than the input data with taint K. Encryption nodes untaint a given label by encrypting the information. While the input data can possess arbitrary privacy-criticality, the output data is always considered completely uncritical 3 .
The encryption nodes allow, that each following component does not need any taints in order to receive, store and forward the data. This holds, until the data is decrypted again. This especially includes in this scenario the exit node, the P4S storage component and the query API.
We assume that the encryption nodes are able to correctly encrypt data streams for the desired recipients and the recipients are in possession of the correct decryption key. Then, after querying the data from the API the local systems of authorized recipients are able to decrypt the obtained data. This restores the previous privacy-criticality of the data.
Results and Insights In the following we describe the results of the formalization of the system at hand.
Data Privacy Protection Goals. Data minimization is performed relatively late:
data is not collected locally with regard to individual users but rather in a centralized manner. As a consequence, central components have full access to the privacy-critical data of all users. More importantly, critical data crosses system boundaries, which makes them susceptible to network attacks. However, an advantage of the design is that data is untainted by encryption before storage.
This prevents attacks of the database which would jeopardize the whole history of collected data.
By using the model, it becomes transparent that the EMS is critical for all users. Furthermore, exactly one path in the P4S graph is dedicated to each user; the untainting is completely identical for all users. Protection of stored data also becomes visible. The data from user C is further processed and derived values are also stored in the database. If user C is not aware of that process, she can intervene and post an application of information to gain further insights.
Due to the aforementioned violations of locality and separation principles, data is linkable in the EMS and in the P4S graph before separation by lters. 4 If further ows besides those depicted in Fig. 2 exist, e. g. combined of several users, exactly these links would also become visible in the model. 3 Under the common assumption that strong state of the art encryption is utilized. 4 The actual instantiation of the model inuences the linkability of data. Given, there are multiple aggregation nodes for dierent taints. When these are actually implemented as the very same component, it reacquires full privacy-criticality. An improvement is to enforce complete statelessness of these components.
Security and Risk Assessment. The rst asset with regard to privacy-protection is the EMS. The EMS is fully privacy-critical and does not employ any protection and untainting measures. Given that it is not build but bought, protection might only be possible by wrapping it. The next critical part of the system is the connection between the EMS controller and the API of the P4S. If applicable, TLS protection can be employed, otherwise measures, which do no need support on the side of the EMS are necessary. An example is VLAN. Furthermore, the P4S is considered to be privacy-critical as it obtains the full stream of data.
On the level of components, from source to sink, the P4S constitutes a gradient with respect to privacy-criticality. With each step, privacy-critical data is more and more untainted. At last, data in the database is completely untainted;
hence, further measures of protection are not strictly necessary here.
We trust in the integrity of the EMS, that is, that it will only send its data to the P4S. Accordingly, we trust the connection not to be susceptible to eavesdropping or man-in-the-middle attacks. Moreover, we expect that there are no data leaks in the P4S and data is only transmitted to the database. There is, however, no need to trust the database itself.
With regard to untainting, we expect the correctness of privacy-protection measures implemented in the ltering, aggregation, and encryption nodes. Without them, components which are now deemed not to process any privacy-relevant data also become critical. Especially Aggregator C is a valuable target for further investigation. Here, actual untainting depends more on the very semantics of the applied function than when using, for example, encryption which works without regard to the meaning of the encrypted data.
Based on the trust assumptions and the assessment of criticality, valuable targets for adversaries are the EMS and the P4S graph. The EMS has an active boundary, hence, intrusion must be considered, being an attack on the integrity of the component, There are, however, no query APIs which have to be protected against unauthorized data access. The Input-API of the P4S graph is a passive boundary, accepting but not providing data. This interface is not to be considered privacy-critical as it only receives information. Nevertheless, possible attacks include POSTing faulty data and provoking denial of service by ooding the system with data. Also having an active boundary, the exit node, intrusion is a concern like for the EMS.
The exit node is not to be considered critical, due to two reasons: It is an active boundary, not allowing data querying and the data is already encrypted and therefore protected.
The database would be critical as it holds all data yet collected. However, this is also not the case due to the previously employed encryption.
MeasrDroid
MeasrDroid [7] is a system for collecting smartphone sensor data. The goal is to utilize the gathered information for research purposes. It may collect information about the current battery power, smartphone orientation, properties of surrounding wi and cellphone networks such as signal strength, latency, and reliability. All information is collected in combination with the current location of the smartphone. This allows to generate maps with respect to the measured properties.
For this purpose, an app is installed on each participating smartphone. The app regularly reads all available (hardware and software) sensor data and encrypts them with a predened public key. The data is then send to UploadDroid , an upload gateway which temporarily stores the collected information. With lower frequency, CollectDroid , a trusted data base server, pulls the information from UploadDroid and decrypts them locally. The data is then stored in a local database on CollectDroid . From these information, statistics and graphs are generated and further analyzed.
Privacy Criticality Privacy criticality comes from the fact all information is not only mappable to an individual identier for each smartphone, but it is also collected including a precise GPS location of it. This enables tracking of users over the time.
System Specication Data is repeatedly collected on the smartphone using the dedicated MeasrDroid app and serialized to a JSON string. The sensor component of the app is the data source. As in IDEM, it is not considered to be a boundary in the formal model. The data is directly and locally encrypted by an internal component using the public key of the trusted CollectDroid server and not saved on the phone in plaintext.
5 From there it is internally forwarded to the upload component which is an active system boundary and POSTs the data to the UploadDroid .
The following components constitute the MeasrDroid backend infrastructure.
The CollectDroid server shall not be accessible from the outside in order to minimize its attack surface. Due to this reason, is it not desired that information is directly pushed to it. Alternatively, the gateway UploadDroid is provided, to which the information can be pushed. Encrypted, and hence privacy-protected information is only temporarily deposited on this server. This server is simultaneously a passive system boundary for the smartphones pushing their data as well as for the CollectDroid server pulling the data. In addition, as discussed in Section 4.2, CollectDroid is also an active boundary. The CollectDroid server consists of a data collection component, a data decryption component, and an actual storage component. Regularly, the trusted and isolated CollectDroid connects to the UploadDroid via SSH and pulls the newly received measurement data. The vital requirement that it may not be contacted from the outside. This can be modeled by not providing any passive system boundaries. After the transfer, data is decrypted and stored there.
In other words, the competing properties of outside access for data pushing on the one hand and trustworthiness due to the handling of unencrypted data on the other hand have been separated into two systems. 5 In consequence, even when the phone is stolen, the advisory cannot reconstruct the whole measurement and location history of this phone.
This derived model is shown in Figure 3 .
The main purpose of the collected data is to support scientic work. The process of data analysis is carried out manually, hence there exists no further infrastructure from this point on, which is relevant for the current elucidations.
Taint Label Specication For the current scenario, we assume several users, each possessing their own tainting label. For three users, the tainting labels A, B, and C exist. Their smartphones collect individual data about them. Hence, the collection component of every smartphone taints the gathered information with the label of the corresponding user. Immediately, the following encryption component again untaints the owner's label. In consequence, the upload component does not have taint labels.
On the side of the MeasrDroid system, the UploadDroid only handles encrypted data which itself cannot decrypt. Hence, it does not have any taint labels. This also applies for the CollectDroid 's data collection component. The CollectDroid decrypts the data and has access to all information of every user. Hence, it is necessary to allow the full taint label set, here being {A, B, C} for its decryption component, as well as the storage component.
Results and Insights Our evaluation of the system specication is analogue to the previous case study. Remarkable dierences are as follows.
Data Privacy Protection Goals. Data collection is distributed and separated from the beginning as each smartphone only collects data about its own user.
This has several benets: Data minimization can already be performed by the client application on the smartphone before it crosses any system boundary.
If the client-side application is open source, full transparency of the running code is given. Also, the foundation for more intervenability is laid, as the app can provide measures to the user, to exactly speciy which information may be collected. Based on separation, linkability of dierent users data is also prevented.
Only after storage, data can potentially be linked.
Security and Risk Assessment. For each user, two assets exist: The user's individual smartphone must be considered critical as well as CollectDroid , which is critical for all users. UploadDroid is considered completely uncritical.
The smartphone app is trusted that its sensor component only collects legitimate data and that the encryption component performs untainting correctly.
Furthermore it is expected that its upload component only pushes this data to UploadDroid (if the data would be sent to a dierent entity, the data cannot be decrypted). Lastly, CollectDroid is trusted with respect to data handling.
Depending on the motivation, two types of attacks can be derived: If surveillance of a single individual is desired, the corresponding smartphone as well as the CollectDroid are potential attack targets. Hence, the integrity of the smartphone, the app, and the trusted backend components has to be assured. When access to all critical information, e. g. for untargeted correlation purposes is desired, then only the trusted backend systems, i. e. the decryption component and the storage component become targets. CollectDroid only has an active boundary; intrusion has to be considered as an important attack vector. Consequently a vital protection is a rewall restricting incoming connections.
While it is obvious that the storage component is highly critical and therefore has to be protected, we consider it a valuable hint by topoS that the decryption component itself have the same level of criticality and need to be protected with the same amount of diligence.
Derivation of Firewall Rules The CollectDroid server has no passive boundaries but only active boundaries to obtain data from the UploadDroid . It can be completely isolated as mentioned before. This could be reected in the rewall conguration:
Drop all incoming connection requests 6 Only allow outgoing connections to UploadDroid Obviously, the rules are structurally analogous to th rules derived for IDEM. This is due to the fact that denition of active and passive boundaries already provides enough information for the generation of the rules. topoS shows that the UploadDroid is a passive system which has to be protected by other means. For the Internet-facing side, each individual user can be given a cryptographic identier in order to authenticate against the APIs of the mentioned systems. Internally, certicates can be utilized in order to perform mutual authentication of the servers.
Auditing the Real MeasrDroid
The previous sections presented a theoretical evaluation of the architecture of MeasrDroid and consequently provide a recipe (cf. Section 4) for evaluating and auditing the real system. MeasrDroid is deployed and in productive use since 2013. The theoretic evaluation of its architecture, presented in this paper, was consists of over 5500 rules.
MeasrDroid relies on the protocols http (port 80), https (port 443), and ssh (port 22). For conciseness, we focus our audit on port 80. Fundamentally, port numbers are not of a big concern for the overall architecture. Notably, our theoretical analysis, in particular Figure 3 , has abstracted over concrete port number all the time.
The model of the MeasrDroid architecture (cf. Figure 3) should be recognizable in the rules of our central rewall. In particular, CollectDroid should not be reachable from the Internet, UploadDroid should be reachable from the Internet, and CollectDroid should be able to pull data from UploadDroid . This information may be hidden somewhere in the more than 5500 IPv4 rewall rules and over 6000 IPv6 rewall rules. We used the fuu tool [13] to extract the access control structure of the rewall. The result is visualized in Figure 4 for IPv4.
The IPv6 structure is shown in Figure 6 . These gures may rst appear highly confusing, which is due to the sheer intrinsic complexity of the access control policy enforced by the rewall. We have highlighted three entities in both gures.
Because the structure and the results are similar for IPv4 and IPv6 and due to its long addresses the IPv6 graph is even worse readable than the IPv4 graph, For the sake of example, simplicity, and presentiveness, we disregard that most machines at the bottom of Figure 4 could attack CollectDroid . 7 Therefore, the huge access control structure at the bottom of Figure 4 is not related to MeasrDroid and can be ignored. We have extracted only the relevant (and simplied) parts in Figure 5 . In the previous paragraph, we only presented the successful parts of the audit. Our audit also revealed many problems related to MeasrDroid, visualized with red arrows. The problems can be clearly recognized in Figure 5 :
UploadDroid can connect to CollectDroid . This is a clear violation of the architecture. We have empirically veried this highly severe problem by logging into UploadDroid and connecting to CollectDroid .
In general, most internal machines may access CollectDroid , which violates the architecture. 7 Our method is also applicable to the complete scenario; this would only decreases clarity without contributing any new insights. We acknowledge the sheer complexity of this real-world setup with all its side-constraints.
There are no restrictions for UploadDroid with regard to outgoing connections. In theory, it should only passively retrieve data and never initiate connections by itself (disregarding system updates).
We uncovered a special IP address with special access rights towards CollectDroid (only shown in the full gure). We found an abandoned server, which has no current relevance for the MeasrDroid system. As a consequence, the access rights were revoked.
Therefore, our audit could verify some core assertions about the actual implementation. In addition, our audit could uncover and conrm serious bugs in the implementation. These bugs were unknown prior to our audit and we could only uncover them with the help of the process proposed in this paper. We manually extended the rules to further allow some core network services such as ICMP, DHCP, DNS, NTP, and SSH for remote management. In addition, we allow further outgoing TCP connections from CollectDroid (for example for system updates) but log those packets. The modied ruleset is illustrated in Figure 8 .
We analyzed the modied rewall with fuu to ensure that it still conforms to the overall policy. fuu immediately veried that CollectDroid is no longer reachable from any machine (excluding localhost connection) over http. We also veried that we will not lock ourselves out from ssh access from our internal network. After this verication, the rewall was deployed to the real CollectDroid machine. Similarly, we implemented and deployed an IPv6 rewall.
Discussion & Future Work
We argued for the benets of our approach and its practical applicability for privacy assessment in Section 4. In this section, we want to discuss potential improvements for future work. We base our discussion on our observation we made during the evaluation.
In both case studies there were storage components, which persist collected data. In general, we consider them to be more inherently critical than components, where data is processed in-memory, forwarded and discarded. This is because these components allow compromising the whole history of data, while stateless processing components can only give access to data which occurred after the attack. Hence, it would be benecial to include this aspect in the model, Another shortcoming focuses on the semantic of taint labels. Currently, they are only categorical values and in consequence only the equality operation is dened. Simultaneously, it is implied that every taint label has the same degree of criticality. The case study of IDEM showed that this is not sucient. Aggregation nodes are often not able to completely remove but only reduce privacy-criticality.
Formally, an initial taint label is removed and a new one is added without being able to denote that the newly added taint label is considered less critical than the former. Similarly, it is imaginable that merge nodes exist which combine data of several dierent taint label types to a combined stream of greater privacycriticality. Hence, the formalism should support the specication of a partial order between taint labels for comparison. Similar to the previous suggestion, it should also be possible to relate taint labels, encoding the information which tainting or untaiting process can transform specic taint labels into other taint labels.
The last remark addresses the semantic of tainting and untainting functions.
The case studies showed that encryption can completely untaint given information, regardless of their previous taints. For every encryption function, a related decryption function must exist, which restores the previous information. Formally, also all previous taint labels are restored. Besides explicit specication of taint labels, it should be possible to relate a pair of encryption and decryption components to enable automatic taint label derivation for the decryption component. The main problem to be avoided is the manual introduction of inconsistencies by updating the taint speciciations of only one entity in such a pair.
We created a wrapper function, which creates an taint-untaint-tuple for the encryption as well as the decryption component when providing the corresponding taint and untaint labels as parameters. This solved the aforementioned problem by the mere introduction of syntactic sugar, hence, not requiring changes of the previously specied formalism nor making further proofs necessary.
Conclusion
Several guidelines and policies for verifying and auditing the privacy properties of IT systems exist. Yet, the task itself is carried out manually, making it complex and time-consuming.
In this paper, we present a model+formalization+technique+recipe based on static taint analysis and show its applicability to the assessment of integral privacy protection goals. From given system designs or existing implementations, a model is derived which makes transmission and processing of privacy-critical data explicit. We show how this information can be used to support the data protection goals of transparency, data minimality, and unlinkability. We integrated our model into the formal policy framework topoS and proved soundness with Isabelle/HOL. Two real-world case studies demonstrate the applicability of our approach, exemplifying that insights formally derived from the model are consistent with manual inspections of the architecture. While the rst case study required manual code auditing, in the second studied system, auditing could be carried out in a completely automated manner, uncovering previously unknown bugs, and providing measures for mitigation.
Availability
Our formalization, case studies, and proofs can be found at https://github.com/diekmann/topoS
